On the same page, both of these points are used to speak of the lack of virtuality in matter, and if the above statements are accepted , then outcome seems easy enough to accept as well. But, then when using the example of mathematical number as being "divisible without changing in kind," and therefor being considered extended (42), things start to get a bit more confused and abstract for me.
On these points I have two questions. Firstly, if the objective has no virtuality and that it is always what is actual, then how do we associate it to matter? Is it not that our perception of matter is always dependent on our actualizing in relation to it? Is this considering that matter is actual independently of all perception?
Secondly, How can we use this argument to claim that number has extension just because it is "divisible without changing in kind" as is matter? I can potentially see number being considered as objective, but have a hard time reconciling it to matter and having extension.
Perhaps I will rue having written this passage five minutes after the lecture this afternoon, where the simple elegance and genius of Bergson's thought will be made explicit (to a simple mind such as my own). But, until then, I will try and understand how matter can can have no virtuality and number can be extended.