Thursday, September 4, 2008
The present movement
Deleuze begins The Movement-Image with a key bergsonian thesis on movement: movement is present in an experience of present-passing. There is no subject that pre-dates movement. Movement creates the conditions for experience, and this experience is infinitely heterogeneous. Each quality of movement is absolutely irreducible to each other quality of movement. This is why movement as such is not divisible. To suggest that movement is divisible is to posit a subject (an experiential spacetime) that predates movement. For Deleuze/Bergson there can be no "objective" movement: spacetimes of experience are created, not moved into. Already in the first paragraph of The Movement-Image, two things seem to be at stake: movement is indivisible and movement is not something that happens "to us." There is no subject for movement. And movement cannot be reconstituted.
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this is very interesting, but also very complex I think. I just finished an article, about the extreme divisibility of the flows of matter (and therefore movement), ad infinitum, a way to reconcile the dissection brought about by the digital (Intended here more as a way of thinking, a conceptual sensation, an idea, than an actual application), with the duration of the virtual. in short, I was trying to understand if infinite divisibility (like the infinite number of microperceptions of Leibniz's calculus) can become infinite malleability. a virtual divisibility, divisibility in potential...
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